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What next for Moldova’s minorities after 
Crimea? 
This Issue Brief examines the possible consequences of Russia’s  annexation of Crimea on 
Moldova and its national minorities. It further reflects on the factors that hinder 
greater integration of persons belonging to minorities, and the expression of minority 
identity in Moldova/Transnistria. The Issue Brief argues there are two indirect 
consequences of the annexation Crimea by Russia. First, the annexation deepens the 
polarization between the pro-Russia and pro-EU camps in Moldova, which manifests 
itself in multiple ruptures within Moldovan society. Second, such a polarization f urthers 
a tendency to marginalize (non-Russian) minorities, which implies  a reduction of the 
spaces for the articulation of minority concerns and the expression of minority identity.  
 
Federica Prina, July 2014 
ECMI Issue Brief # 33 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
alarmist headlines have propelled Moldova 
into the limelight, with fears that 
Transnistria would be next in line in 
Russia’s ‘land grab’. Concerns have been 
linked to a possible drive by Russia to annex 
as much of the territory of the former Soviet 
republics as possible. While, at the other end 
of the spectrum, the European Union (EU) 
has been portrayed as fighting Russia’s 
imperialistic expansionism by offering 
Moldova alluring ‘carrots’, in the shape of a 
visa-free regime and trade agreements. 
Thus, two powerful actors (the EU on one 
side, and Russia on the other) have been 
seen to be competing to expand their spheres 
of influence over a small state lying between 
them. For Russia, the aim has presumably 
been to continue building upon the ‘success’ 
of Crimea. For the EU, to avoid another 
Crimean scenario.   
There has been less media interest in 
the situation within Moldova. Generally the 
Western media has presented things this 
way: Transnistria as pro-Russia; Moldova 
(without Transnistria) as a state wishing to 
reduce its dependency on Russia and move 
closer to the EU, thereby shedding its Soviet 
legacy; and Gagauzia, a small autonomous 
region within Moldova, as opting to remain 
within the Russian sphere. This sketch of the 
existing situation clearly overlooks the 
nuances within these regions. Meanwhile, 
events in Crimea prompt the question: what 
does its annexation mean to Moldova and its 
ethnic groups – not only 
Moldovans/Romanians or ethnic Russians, 
but also other (non-Russian) minorities? 
One can further ask what the EU should 
 ECMI- Issue Brief # 33 
 
 
4 | P a g e  
 
expect in relation to Moldova’s fulfilment of 
the conditions for European integration in 
the area of minority rights, if the EU indeed 
succeeds in bringing Moldova closer to 
Europe – which in the future might entail the 
application of the Copenhagen Criteria. 
This issue brief argues there are two 
indirect consequences of the annexation 
Crimea: 
 The annexation deepens the 
polarization between the pro-Russia and 
pro-EU camps in Moldova, which manifests 
itself in multiple ruptures within Moldovan 
society. 
 Such a polarization furthers a 
tendency to marginalize (non-Russian) 
minorities, which implies a reduction of the 
spaces for the articulation of minority 
concerns and the expression of minority 
identity. 
 
This issue brief is divided into two parts, 
addressing both issues – which are 
themselves closely interlinked, the second 
deriving from the first. It further examines, 
in the second part, the factors that hinder 
greater integration of persons belonging to 
minorities, and the expression of minority 
identity in Moldova and Transnistria.  
The issue brief does not examine a 
possible annexation of Transnistria by 
Russia. It has been argued
1
 (albeit before the 
Crimean crisis) that Russia’s priority in 
Moldova has not been Transnistria’s 
recognition as an independent state or its 
annexation, but rather Russia’s ability to 
exercise control over Tiraspol and Chisinau, 
by correspondingly limiting the EU’s 
influence. Additionally, unlike in the case of 
Ukraine, Transnistria does not share a 
border with Russia. Thus, this issue brief 
refrains from considering drastic changes to 
the geopolitical status quo; it highlights 
instead more subtle shifts affecting Moldova 
society, which can act to aggravate some of 
the difficulties faced by its minorities.  
 
2. DEEPENING 
POLARIZATION, MULTIPLYING 
FRACTURES 
 
A clear pro-EU choice was made by 
Chisinau throughout the preparatory process 
and the signature, on 27 June 2014, of the 
EU Association Agreement, which includes 
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(AA/DCFTA). The implementation of the 
agreement will deepen political and 
economic ties between Moldova and the EU; 
it contains a total of 465 articles in the areas 
of: political dialogue; justice, freedom and 
security; economic cooperation and trade; 
financial assistance, and anti-fraud and 
control provisions.
2
 Among other things, the 
agreement refers directly to minorities: in its 
preamble (stating that the EU member states 
are ‘committed to strengthening respect for 
fundamental freedoms, human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities […]’), and at Articles 3 and 32.
3
  
The Moldovan authorities have 
striven to present the signing of the 
agreement not as an either-or choice, but as 
the establishment of stronger trade links 
with the EU while also maintaining close 
relations to Russia. Moldovan leaders have 
sought to maintain a dialogue with both the 
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EU and Russia.
4
 However, much is at stake. 
The crisis in Ukraine was precipitated 
exactly by disagreements over the signing of 
an accord with the EU in November 2013 
(which former Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych refrained from signing, instead 
pursuing closer links with Russia). In 
Moldova concerns have been voiced that the 
Crimean precedent might lead to a spillover 
of violence into southern Moldova, 
particularly with reference to Gagauzia.
5
 
Chisinau needs both the EU and Russia, for 
its economy and natural resources;
6
 
Transnistria acutely needs Russia: Russia 
provides financial support to the breakaway 
region in addition to being its primary trade 
partner, although Tiraspol has also 
established some trade links with the EU.  
If Moldova and Transnistria are 
often seen as contended by powerful actors 
to their East and West, the Moldovan 
population is also susceptible to a binary 
thinking (pro-EU or pro-Russia) because it 
reflects, and reinforces, an inner division. 
Much of it is explained by Moldova’s 
history, the territories on the left and right 
banks of the river Dniester/Nistru having 
followed two different historical trajectories. 
The section west of the river (the right bank) 
became part of Romania in 1918 and was 
annexed by the Soviet Union only in 1940. 
7
Instead, the territory of present Transnistria 
was incorporated into the Soviet Union as 
early as 1922. Moreover, the perestroika and 
post-independence periods saw the 
flourishing of Moldovan nationalism; as in 
other former Soviet republics, Moldova has 
attempted to establish a ‘nationalizing 
state’,8 distancing itself from Soviet ‘multi-
nationality’, and opting for the ‘one-
language one-state’ model. The most 
enthusiastic nationalists have ultimately 
aimed at unification with Romania, from 
which the Soviet Union had forcefully 
separated the people of present Moldova in 
1940. The Soviet authorities made sustained 
efforts to forge a Moldovan identity distinct 
from the Romanian one, putting forth the 
view that ‘Moldovan’ was a separate 
language from Romanian. In reality the 
main difference was the alphabet – Latin for 
Romanian and Cyrillic for Moldovan, after 
the Cyrillic alphabet was introduced in the 
Soviet period. It is no accident, then, that 
already in 1989, Moldova, while still a 
Soviet republic, declared Moldovan, written 
in the Latin script, the sole state language.
9
 
The drive towards the ultimate 
establishment of a de facto nation-state is 
evidenced by the choice of the ‘one-
language one-state’ model over 
bilingualism; meanwhile, the introduction of 
the Latin alphabet in 1989 was a clear sign 
of emancipation from the Soviet Union: the 
alphabet had become the symbol of an 
artificial separation of persons belonging to 
the same nation, with a Soviet border 
between them.  
The linguistic divide is apparent 
when one looks at data on population and 
patterns of language use. According to the 
last (2004) census, in Moldova (without 
Transnistria) 75.81% of the population self-
identified as Moldovan, 8.35% as Ukrainian, 
5.95% as Russian, 4.36% as Gagauz, 2.17 % 
as Romanian, 1.94% as Bulgarian and 1.32% 
as ‘other’ (including Roma).
10
 Moreover, 
75.2% of the population use as main 
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language of communication 
Romanian/Moldovan, 16% Russian, 3.8% 
Ukrainian, 3.1% Gagauz and 1.1% 
Bulgarian.
11
 Thus, those who use the state 
language as their main language of 
communication (75.2% of the population) 
largely correspond to the section of the 
population that self-identifies as either 
Moldovans or Romanians (77.97%). Most of 
the persons belonging to national minorities, 
which overall amount to 22% of the 
population, use Russian as main language of 
communication. Those who primarily use 
Ukrainian, Gagauz or Bulgarian are likely to 
still use Russian as language of inter-ethnic 
communication. 
 
2.1. The EU versus Russia? 
 
The Crimean crisis has created stronger 
incentives to bring Moldova closer to the 
EU. With reference to the crisis, the 
European Commissioner for Enlargement 
and Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, 
stated in May 2014 that ‘now is the time to 
show an even stronger, more determined, 
and resolute commitment to the Eastern 
Partnership’ 12and ‘[w]e will always support 
and stand by those who are subject to undue 
pressures’. 13Already in December 2013 the 
President of the European Council Herman 
Van Rompuy had referred to protests in 
Ukraine when he stated that ‘[t]o my mind, 
the future of Ukraine lies with Europe. One 
can try to slow it down, to block it, but in 
the end no one can prevent it.’ He further 
acknowledged an ‘aspiration to come closer 
to the European Union’ in the people of 
Moldova and Georgia. Thus, he stated that 
the European Council was ‘willing to speed 
up the signing of the agreements with them 
[Moldova and Georgia], next August at the 
latest’14 - which was then further brought 
forward to June 2014. Van Rompuy 
attempted to distance himself from direct 
competition with Russia, by stating that 
‘[w]e have made it abundantly clear that the 
European Union’s agreements with partner 
countries in the region are not at Russia’s 
expense. On the contrary, it is also set to 
benefit from it.’ Füle used a similarly 
conciliatory tone when he noted that ‘The 
EU’s relations with Russia in the energy 
field are those of mutual interdependence.’15 
Despite these diplomatic efforts, the 
balance is a delicate one. The EU markets 
can easily be seen as an alternative to the 
Russia-promoted Eurasian Customs Union.
16
 
In September 2013 Russia banned imports 
of wine and spirits from Moldova (most 
likely prompted by Chisinau’s dealings with 
the EU);
17
 in the same month the European 
Commission (EC) offered to open its 
markets to the same wine imports.
18 
As 
Moldova relies entirely on Russia for gas 
imports, the EC has supported the building 
of the Ungheni-Iaşi pipeline, connecting 
Moldova and Romania, for Moldova to also 
be a recipient of gas from the EU.
19
 On 28 
April 2014 visa-free travel in the Schengen 
area was introduced for Moldovan citizens
20
 
- the first to benefit from this arrangement 
among the Eastern Partnership countries.
21
 
On 6 May 2014, the EC announced a 
support package of €30 million towards the 
realization of the Association Agreement.
22
 
Funding for this package was granted 
through the ‘more for more’ scheme, which 
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uses an ‘incentive-based approach’, 
described as: ‘the more a country is 
committed to and makes progress in 
reforms, the more assistance it can expect 
from the EU.’23 
This approach seems to be bearing 
fruit. According to the Eastern Partnership 
Index,
24
 Moldova has been a more willing 
reformer than other countries of the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership. Progress towards 
Europeanization has included reform to the 
justice sector and the completion of the 
Association Agreement negotiations.
25
 
Following incentives by the EU (as well as 
the UN and Council of Europe), in 2012 
Moldova adopted anti-discrimination 
legislation, the Law on the Guarantee of 
Equality,
26
 which refers to EU directives in 
its preamble.
27
 Moldovan President Nicolae 
Timofti has not hidden his hopes that 
Moldova could become an EU member state 
in the future.
28
 
Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister and State Secretary Grigory 
Karasin described the signing of the 
Association Agreement as ‘a major event for 
both Moldova and our bilateral relations.’29 
Russian-Moldovan diplomatic consultations 
were held on 10-11 June 2014, and aimed at 
the ‘neutralization of negative impacts of 
Moldova’s association with the European 
Union’.30 Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy 
prime minister and presidential envoy to 
Transnistria, in 2013 warned that the EU 
agreement could jeopardize Russia’s gas 
supplies to Chisinau.
31
 He later added that 
he would ‘insist on revising economic 
relations with Moldova if it chooses the 
association’.32 The Russian-language media 
in Moldova seems to have been promoting 
the integration of Moldova into the Eurasian 
Customs Union of ex-Soviet republics as an 
alternative to EU markets.
33
 This situation 
can lead to an unsteady balance between the 
EU and Russia’s influences, encouraging a 
view of mutually exclusive (Eastwards or 
Westwards) possible orientations for 
Moldova.  
 
2.2. The  East-West  Dichotomy  and 
Transnistria 
 
A Western orientation is linked to 
Chisinau’s efforts to distance itself from 
Sovietization and move towards a ‘nation-
state’, which to many also implies 
Romanization. In 1992 the Transnistrian 
conflict broke out exactly as a reaction to a 
‘nationalizing state’ policy – one where the 
titular ethnicity positions itself as core ethnic 
group within a state.
34
 This policy has been 
followed by nearly all post-Soviet states – 
yet, in the case of Moldova, the proximity 
(geographical, cultural and particularly 
linguistic) with Romania led to fears of 
marginalization and/or discrimination 
among non-titulars. It turn, the conflict 
contributed to a more marked polarization of 
the population of the former Soviet republic. 
In rejecting the ‘nationalizing state’, 
Transnistria has opted for a multi-ethnic (de 
facto) state; indeed, here the ‘frozen 
conflict’ much differs from, for example, the 
one in Abkhazia, in that there has been no 
ethnic cleansing: in Transnistria Moldovans 
continue to live alongside ethnic Russians 
and Ukrainians, these groups (forming a 
population of approximately 500,000 
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people) having for the most part peacefully 
coexisted since 1992. 
Russia has largely succeeded in 
anchoring Transnistria within its own sphere 
of influence. De jure Transnistria is still part 
of Moldova, given that no country has 
recognized its independence: Chisinau 
considers it an integral part of the territory 
of Moldova, illegally under the control of a 
separatist regime,
35
 and the international 
community recognizes the territorial 
integrity of Moldova. The Moldovan 
government, however, is unable to enforce 
its jurisdiction in Transnistria,
36
 which has 
instead operated as an independent state, 
primarily through Russia’s support.37  
Russia’s influence over Transnistria 
is not absolute. The candidate favoured by 
Russia in the last (2011) presidential 
elections, Anatoly Kaminsky - whose 
posters unambiguously stated ‘supported by 
Putin’ - was defeated. Victory went instead 
to Yevgeny Shevchuk, who had led an anti-
corruption and pro-transparency movement, 
and who replaced the veteran president Igor 
Smirnov (1991-2011). Under Shevchuk, the 
5+2 conflict settlement talks
38
 revived, and 
progress was made towards integration with 
both Moldova and Europe: some trade links 
were established with the EU; dialogue with 
Chisinau improved; and Transnistrian 
businesses were registered with the 
Moldovan authorities.
39
 This, however, does 
not change the fact that Shevchuk is the 
leader of a region that is very largely 
dependent on Russia. Significantly, 
following his election, Shevchuk’s first trip 
was to Moscow. More crucially, the post-
Crimean scenario has led to retrogressive 
steps in the rapprochement with Chisinau, 
resulting in a renewed pro-Russia 
orientation. In April 2014 Transnistria’s 
parliament called for its international 
recognition by Russia and international 
organizations; it referred to a referendum 
held in 2006, in which 97% of the 
population voted in favour of independence 
from Moldova and the right to join Russia.
40
 
Shevchuk in June 2014 spoke of a ‘civilised 
divorce’ with Moldova, and stated that 
Chisinau’s signing of the EU’s Association 
Agreement would have ‘a negative 
economic impact’ on Transnistria.41 He 
referred to the 2006 referendum as proof 
that Transnistrians did not wish to reunify 
with Moldova.
42
 During a visit to Tiraspol in 
May 2014, Russia’s presidential envoy to 
Transnistria Dmitry Rogozin received 
petitions signed by Transnistrians requesting 
unification with Russia.
43
 
Following the Crimean crisis, 
Rogozin also stated that Ukraine had placed 
Transnistria under ‘blockade’,44 while 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov 
reaffirmed Russia’s policy of ‘defending the 
interests’ of Russians living abroad.45 
Approximately 130,000 people in 
Transnistria have Russian passports; 
meanwhile, Chisinau has waived fees for 
first-time applications of Moldovan 
passports, which now offer the advantage of 
visa-free travel to Schengen countries.
46
 
The relations between Moscow and 
Chisinau became frosty when, in May 2014, 
Rogozin’s jet was raided by special forces at 
Chisinau airport where a number of the 
petitions (referred to above) were seized 
from him. His jet was forced to land in 
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Chisinau after he was denied access to 
Romanian and Ukrainian airspace; in a tweet 
that shocked many, Rogozin stated that he 
would use one of Russia’s supersonic 
bombers in his next visit to the region.
47
 
 
2.3. Polarization in Moldova West  of 
the River  Dniester/Nistru 
 
Since the early 1990s aspirations for 
reunification with Romania, which had 
triggered Moldova’s territorial split, have 
been set aside. Yet an East-West 
polarization is still an intrinsic aspect of 
Moldovan society, and it exists within 
Moldova ‘proper’ (west of the river 
Dniester/Nistru). Diverging views in this 
area do not only characterize relations 
between the majority population and ethnic 
Russians/Russophone minorities; instead, 
majority nationalism itself presents a 
bifurcation: the Moldovanist position treats 
the state language as a separate language 
from Romanian (as ‘Moldovan’), while the 
Romanist position sees it as 
indistinguishable from Romanian. The first 
position emphasizes Moldova’s separateness 
from Romania,
48
 and its supporters generally 
favour closer links with Russia; those who 
espouse the second position consider the 
expression ‘Moldovan language’ per se a 
Russian/Soviet imposition.
49
 Such disputes 
continue in the presence of an uncertain 
Moldovan identity, and, significantly, they 
reflect opposing positions over the future of 
the country – whether with Russia, or with 
the EU.
50
 They largely parallel support for 
an Eurasian Customs Union or enhanced 
trade regime with the EU. 
The Moldovan population and 
political parties have aligned themselves 
either with the Moldovanist or Romanist 
position. Language issues have become 
intertwined with politics – with the 
Communist Party (in power during 2001-
2009) referring to the state language as 
‘Moldovan’, and promoting pro-Russia 
policies.
51
 The Communist Party has also 
promoted pro-Russian policies by 
supporting the introduction of Russian as a 
second state language and reintroducing its 
compulsory study in all schools.
52
 A 
possible upgrade of the status of Russian 
constitutes political capital as it appeals not 
only to ethnic Russians but to other 
minorities as well, given their frequent lack 
of fluency in the state language. Minorities 
have generally voted for the Communist 
Party, supporting closer links to Russia; by 
contrast, the present ruling coalition is 
significantly called ‘Alliance for European 
Integration’ (AEI). Despite political 
instability over the past few years, the AEI 
has advanced Europeanization.  
These mutually exclusive approaches 
have inflamed passions and sparked riots 
and demonstrations over the years. Yet the 
decision to support one or the other camp 
has not necessarily been ethnicity-based or 
ideological; it is also linked to pragmatic 
considerations of what course of action 
offers better prospects of higher living 
standards and economic prosperity. 
Although ethnic minorities generally favour 
closer links with Russia, the 
Moldovan/Romanian population is split on 
the issue.
53
 Even pragmatic considerations, 
however, do not change the fact that 
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language and identity have strong symbolic 
value, and can be divisive. Moreover, the 
appropriation of language disputes by 
political parties can complicate the devising 
and full implementation of coherent ethno-
linguistic policies
54
 – as well as aggravating 
the volatility of the political environment.
55
 
 
2.4. Regional Divisions: Chisinau and 
Comrat 
 
Within the framework of an East-West 
polarization one can also fit developments in 
Gagauzia. Gagauzia became an autonomous 
region of Moldova in 1994.
56
 Like 
Transnistria, it has opposed the 
‘nationalizing state’ model, and resisted 
Romanization.
57
 The regional authorities in 
Comrat, Gagauzia’s capital, harbour 
grievances against Chisinau with regard to 
the state’s centralization and denial of 
genuine devolution. Given the legacy of 
Russian as the language of inter-ethnic 
communication in (Soviet and post-Soviet) 
Moldova, Gagauz tend to speak Russian 
rather than the state language (or Gagauz). 
Despite the fact that in Gagauzia the vast 
majority (82.1%) of the population are 
Gagauz (ethnic Russians amounting only to 
3.8% and Moldovans to 4.8% of the 
population), most of the schools operate in 
Russian.
58
 Russian is also the main language 
of communication used by the regional 
authorities.
59
 In parliamentary elections, the 
majority of votes in Gagauzia have gone to 
the Communist Party. Although Gagauz is a 
Turkic language - and some 2-3,000 Gagauz 
are guest workers in Turkey - Gagauzia’s 
links with Russia remain strong. The 
Gagauz population is largely unimpressed 
by the establishment of a visa-free regime 
with the EU (widely seen as prohibitively 
expensive to travel to) while Russia offers 
tangible economic opportunities in a region 
badly afflicted by poverty. In addition to 
part of its labour force working in Russia, 
Gagauzia trades with Russia – tellingly, 
when Russia banned imports of Moldovan 
wine in 2013, it made an exception for 
Gagauzia.
60
 Although not all Gagauz are 
opposed to European integration,
61
 overall 
the pro-Russia choice is unambiguous: in a 
referendum held on 2 February 2014, 98.4% 
of Gagauzia’s residents voted in favour of 
joining the Russia-sponsored Eurasian 
Customs Union, while 97.2% were against 
EU integration.
62
 Gagauzia’s president has 
stated that, if Moldova joined the EU, 
Gagauzia would secede. 63 
 
3. MARGINALIZATION OF 
MINORITIES 
 
The scenario described above reveals the 
presence of multiple rifts within Moldovan 
society, which are exacerbated by 
international actors’ influences, internal 
dynamics becoming intertwined with 
external ones. This situation raises the 
question as to whether Transnistria and 
Gagauzia are likely to further gravitate away 
from Chisinau. An additional consequence 
of the East-West polarization in Moldovan 
society is that it can exacerbate the existing 
marginalization of (non-Russian) minorities: 
the East-West duality, itself made more 
prominent by the Crimean crisis, can detract 
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attention from issues that impair the 
enjoyment of minority rights. These issues, 
in the case of Moldova (excluding 
Transnistria), can be subdivided into: 
difficulties in providing adequate protection 
to vulnerable minorities; the progressive 
dilution of linguistic and cultural diversity; 
and obstacles to minority empowerment. 
These complexities, which are addressed in 
the next three subsections, persist despite the 
protection offered to minorities under 
domestic law (especially the 1994 
Constitution and the Law ‘On the Rights of 
Persons belonging to National Minorities 
and the Legal Status of their Organizations’- 
the Law on Minorities
64
), and international 
law (particularly ratification of the Council 
of Europe’s Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities
65
 - 
FCNM). The specificities of the 
Transnistrian situation require separate 
consideration, and are outlined in the last 
subsection.  
 
3.1. Obstacles to the Protection of 
Vulnerable Minorities 
 
Obstacles to effective protection of 
minorities are linked to: the extremely 
severe marginalization affecting Roma in 
Moldova; and deficiencies in policies and 
legislation promoting minority rights, 
particularly due to the opacity of relevant 
legal provisions and weak mechanisms for 
implementation. In the case of Roma,
66
 
although the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) 2013 country progress report 
noted some improvement with regard to 
their levels of societal inclusion,
67
 
formidable challenges exist: from 
discrimination to socio-economic issues 
(extreme poverty, unemployment, social 
exclusion and unequal opportunities
68
), as 
well as impaired access to justice.
69
 Levels 
of education are low, with 43% of Roma 
children not attending school, against 6% of 
non-Roma children; drop-out rates are 
particularly high for girls.
70
 As a result, the 
illiteracy rate among Roma is 21%, 
compared to 2% for the majority 
population.
71
  
A second issue affecting minority 
groups more generally lies in the impaired 
implementation of policies and legislation 
concerning minorities. The Law on 
Minorities is generally declarative, and its 
provisions do not offer the legal clarity that 
would enable their translation into concrete 
action.
72
 Moldovan civil society has also 
pointed to negligence in the implementation 
of the legislation in force, including 
provisions on the protection of minority 
languages.
73
 The Moldovan authorities have 
produced various ‘action plans’, including in 
the areas of human rights and protection of 
Roma. Despite their name, these documents 
primarily contain general principles. For 
example, the first Action Plan on Roma, 
adopted in 2001, was devoid of 
implementation mechanisms and did not 
envisage the allocation of financial 
resources for its realization. Subsequent 
action plans benefited from international 
expertise from the Council of Europe, the 
EU and the OSCE/ODIHR: thus, the last 
Action Plan on Roma (for 2011-2015)
74
 is 
more conducive to concrete action, and 
provides that local authorities are to devise 
 ECMI- Issue Brief # 33 
 
 
12 | P a g e  
 
their own action plans to be implemented at 
the local level. A paucity of resources, 
however, remains a key issue.  
Greater legal clarity in the area of 
anti-discrimination legislation was gained 
through the adoption by the Moldovan 
Parliament of the Law on the Guarantee of 
Equality in May 2012.
75
 Prior to its adoption 
provisions on discrimination were contained 
in disparate pieces of legislation, many of 
which were declarative and devoid of 
mechanisms to eradicate discrimination.
76
 
The Law foresees the use of special 
measures, including affirmative action, to 
prevent or reverse discriminatory practices. 
The 2013 ENP country progress report noted 
that, in 2013, the Law ‘began to be 
effectively implemented’,77 which was 
accompanied by reform of the justice sector 
since the establishment of the new 
government in May 2013.
78
 However, these 
legal amendments and policy changes have 
taken place in an environment of low public 
awareness of discrimination - including 
among potential victims, the judiciary and 
law-enforcement officials.
79
 
 
3.2. Reduction  of Linguistic and 
Cultural Diversity 
 
While the levels of social isolation of Roma 
are particularly high, other minorities 
experience another form of marginalization 
– one that is primarily cultural and 
linguistic. The spaces for the expression of 
minority identity have decreased as the 
Moldovan authorities have focused on the 
difficult task of upgrading 
Romanian/Moldovan to a fully-recognized 
state language, replacing Russian as the 
primary means of (inter-ethnic) 
communication. Indeed, Russian still enjoys 
residual prestige from the Soviet period, 
which regarded it as the language of the 
intelligentsia;
80
 those who are primarily 
Russian-speakers tend to resist moves 
towards a language shift.
81
 Meanwhile, 
minority languages remain at the margins of 
the two principal linguistic spheres.  
Moldovan law provides for the use 
and protection of other languages spoken in 
the country besides Moldovan.
82
 At the 
same time, while Moldovan is by law the 
state language, the Law on Languages 
stipulates that Russian is used alongside 
Moldovan as the ‘language of inter-ethnic 
communication’ (Art. 3).83 The Law on 
Minorities effectively places Russian in a 
position ‘in between’ the state and other 
minority languages – a privileged position 
that implies its precedence over other 
minority languages. For example, Article 
6(1) states:  
 
The State shall guarantee the fulfillment 
of the rights of persons belonging to 
national minorities to […] education 
[…] in Moldovan and Russian, and shall 
create the conditions for fulfilling their 
right to education and instruction in the 
mother tongue (Ukrainian, Gagauz, 
Bulgarian, Hebrew, Yiddish, etc.). 
[emphasis added]  
 
Despite the promotion of multilingualism 
intrinsic to Soviet nationalities policy, 
during the Soviet period Bulgarians, 
Ukrainians and other ethnic groups 
incrementally substituted the use of their 
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own language with Russian (and to a lesser 
extent Romanian/Moldovan). Treating 
Russian as language of inter-ethnic 
communication prolongs a tendency of 
linguistically aligning Moldova’s minorities 
to the Russian-speaking sphere.
84 
The 
reversal of past assimilationist forces would 
require active interventions by the 
Moldovan government to alter the linguistic 
environment. Yet only limited efforts have 
been made in this direction.
85
 Schools are 
predominantly monolingual, with instruction 
either in the state language or Russian. 
Courses in minority languages are provided 
only in schools with Russian as main 
language of instruction. Ukrainians, 
Bulgarians and Gagauz who choose to 
attend Romanian-medium schools have no 
opportunity to study their native languages. 
In 2009 there were 55 schools where 
Ukrainian was taught, although the number 
of settlements where Ukrainians made up 
more than half of the population was over 
100.
86
 6,300 Ukrainian children studied 
Ukrainian as a subject, against a population 
of 280,000 Ukrainians (of whom 
approximately one fifth, or 56,000, were 
children).
87
 Opportunities to study through 
the medium of minority languages remain 
extremely limited, and non-existent in the 
case of Romani.
88
 According to the same 
2009 data, only 0.06% of Ukrainian children 
studied through the medium of Ukrainian, 
and 0.02 of Bulgarian children in 
Bulgarian.
89
 Other factors affecting the right 
of minorities to avail themselves of 
education in the native language are: limited 
or lack of knowledge of these rights; limited 
availability of materials and teachers’ 
training; and lack of prospects of higher 
education in minority languages.
90
 The 
ACFC has recommended that the teaching 
of minority languages (other than Russian) 
is provided in Romanian-medium schools, 
and generally that multilingual education is 
expanded.
91
 Multilingual education is 
available in only a few experimental 
schools, which use Ukrainian (or Bulgarian), 
the state language and Russian.
92
 
There are also few opportunities to 
use minority languages other than Russian in 
communication with administrative 
authorities, where Russian continues to be 
used as language of inter-ethnic 
communication; this is also the case in the 
autonomous region of Gagauzia.
93
 In 
villages with a dense concentration of 
Ukrainians,
94
 Ukrainian cultural life has 
primarily been confined to the private 
sphere: there has been restricted exposure to 
Ukrainian culture and language, due to the 
paucity of books, newspapers and magazines 
in Ukrainian in local libraries, and poorly 
functioning cultural infrastructures in 
villages.
95
 
The media does not reflect 
Moldova’s ethno-linguistic diversity.96 
Although public radio and television do 
broadcast in various minority languages,
97
 
overall in regions with concentrations of 
persons belonging to minorities there is very 
limited access to quality programming in 
minority languages during prime-time
98
 - 
particularly with regard to the Ukrainian, 
Bulgarian and numerically smaller 
minorities, and in rural areas.
99
 Moreover, 
although some newspapers and magazines 
publish in minority languages (Ukrainian, 
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Russian, Gagauz and Polish),
100
 the minority 
print media is not financially supported by the 
state. Thus, print media outputs in minority 
languages appear only sporadically, being 
dependent on the varying resources of 
minority organizations themselves.101 
 
3.3. The Obstacles  to Minority 
Empowerment  
 
Long-lasting, wide-reaching effects in the 
promotion of minority rights are likely to be 
brought about through the empowerment of 
minorities – by enabling their 
representatives to directly claim their rights 
via political representation, consultation and 
regional autonomy. These processes also act 
to further integrate minorities, thereby 
reducing their marginalization and social 
isolation. However, in Moldova obstacles to 
minority participation exist in the areas of 
consultation, representation in elected and 
state bodies, and centre-periphery relations – 
including with regard to Gagauzia.  
 
Consultation and Representation 
Although the consultation of minorities is 
foreseen by Moldovan legislation,
102
 
obstacles to it are linked to some Soviet 
institutional legacies, themselves combined 
with a tendency to centralized decision-
making. One such legacy is the apolitical 
approach to minority issues, which are 
framed primarily in the context of culture 
rather than encompassing a range of 
interests - cultural but also socio-economic 
and political.
103
 The main Moldovan 
institution for the realization of minority 
policies is the Bureau of Interethnic 
Relations, which also coordinates FCNM 
implementation. The Bureau has been 
widely criticized for its lack of effectiveness 
or influence over decision-making - due to, 
among other things, insufficient financial 
and human resources to fulfill its functions, 
as well as an excessive focus on cultural 
issues.
104
 
Second, minorities have only limited 
representation in elected and state bodies. 
The 2007 Law on Political Parties prohibits 
the establishment of parties on the basis of 
ethnicity.
105
 Some representatives of 
minorities have been elected to Parliament 
and locally-elected bodies through 
mainstream political parties.
106
 However, the 
ACFC
107
 has pointed out that enabling 
minorities to establish their own ethnic 
parties ‘could make it possible for the 
concerns and interests of persons belonging 
to national minorities, particularly in the 
regions where they live in substantial 
numbers, to be better represented and 
possibly better taken into account in elected 
bodies, at the local and central levels’.108 
Indeed, the mere presence of persons 
belonging to minorities in elected bodies 
does not imply that minority interests will be 
represented. Mainstream political parties 
have no direct responsibility vis-à-vis 
minority groups, and it was argued that 
existing political structures are ‘rarely 
sensitive’ to the needs of persons belonging 
to minorities.
109
 Inadequate political 
representation has particularly affected 
Roma: their members are hardly ever found 
in local or regional councils where Roma 
communities reside.
110
 Scarce minority 
representation tends to also affect executive 
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power structures, the judiciary and law-
enforcement organs,
111
 despite legislation 
providing for proportional representation of 
minorities.
112
 One of the factors limiting 
access to public employment by persons 
belonging to minorities is lack of fluency in 
the state language, which is required by 
Moldovan law for civil servant positions.
113
  
 
Regional and Local Autonomy  
The EU has emphasized the need to 
decentralize, linking it to ‘strengthening 
institutional capacity, efficient use of public 
resources and optimization of local 
administration.’114 Decentralization is also 
likely to assist minorities achieve better 
representation, and, ultimately, 
empowerment – both with regard to regional 
autonomy (Gagauzia) and local autonomy. 
Moldova’s centralized structures mean that 
most decision-making takes place at the 
central, sometimes regional, level, without 
the involvement of local authorities, 
including with regard to Gagauzia.
115
 
Autonomy was granted to Gagauzia in 1994 
under internal and external pressure to 
resolve mounting tensions in the region, at a 
time of acute instability, due the Moldova’s 
recent transition from Soviet republic to 
independent state. Yet, as the central 
authorities became stronger, Gagauz 
autonomy was reduced rather than 
progressing towards its institutionalization 
and consolidation.
116
 Legal provisions on the 
distribution of competences between the 
centre and the autonomous region have 
remained vague,
117
 while the central 
authorities have taken decisions without 
consideration for the special arrangements 
for Gagauzia foreseen by law.
118
 It has led to 
tensions between the Gagauz and central 
authorities; the absence of violent conflict 
can be at least partly explained by 
Gagauzia’s financial dependency upon the 
centre.
119
 In the same vein, for the 
Bulgarians concentrated in the Taraclia 
district (in the south-east of Moldova), over-
centralization of decision-making on matters 
such as education, culture and language use 
have caused tensions between the central 
and local authorities.
120
  
Decentralization could also benefit 
minorities at the micro level. Data for 
villages with compact Ukrainian settlements 
point to an inexistent or very limited 
participation in local decision-making.
121
 
Similarly, Roma communities have had very 
little influence on decision-making at the 
local level, including on issues directly 
affecting them, such as the administration of 
rural areas where they reside. As noted, 
Roma are very rarely elected to local 
councils, and there is no practice of informal 
consultation or self-government.
122
 Even if 
minority groups were invited to contribute to 
discussions at the local level, the outcomes 
would likely be scattered, since the local 
administration is dependent on central 
ministries, for financial, social, cultural and 
educational matters. One area in which 
centralized decision-making has 
repercussions on minorities is that of 
curriculum development with regard to the 
teaching of and through the medium of 
minority languages. Meanwhile, the division 
into raiony (administrative districts) of areas 
with large concentrations of Ukrainians and 
Bulgarians often places their representatives 
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into separate districts. By affecting the 
percentage of these minorities per district, 
this in turns lowers the opportunities for 
their members to collectively claim and 
enjoy rights relating to education, culture, 
language and media.
 123
 
 
3.4. Transnistria: a (Russian-
dominated) Multi-ethnic Region 
 
The ideological approach to ethnic-linguistic 
policy in Transnistria sharply differs from 
the rest of Moldova. The legislation adopted 
by the de facto state declares it multi-
national, distancing it from the 
‘nationalizing state’ model - one with a core 
ethnicity, and one predominant language. 
The Supreme Soviet of Transnistria in 
March 1991 adopted a decision on ‘urgent 
measures for preserving the identity of the 
Moldovan people, and their language and 
culture’, thereby emphatically rejecting 
Romanization.
124
 Russia maintains a strong, 
sustained influence on the region, while, in 
turn, Transnistria has made it clear that it 
places itself on the pro-Russia side of the 
East-West divide.  
Transnistria’s approach to ethno-
linguistic policy is modelled around the 
Soviet approach to multi-nationality. The 
legislation recognizes three official 
languages: Moldovan, Russian and 
Ukrainian.
125
 These are the languages of the 
three main ethnic groups that reside in 
Transnistria: Moldovans (31.9% of the 
population according to the 2004 census
126
), 
Russians (30.3%) and Ukrainians (28.8%). 
Moreover, in stark contrast with Chisinau, 
Transnistria recognizes exclusively the 
Cyrillic alphabet for Moldovan, while the 
use of the Latin script for Moldovan is 
prohibited by law.
127
  
Although Transnistrian legislation 
includes provisions which can enhance the 
protection of persons belonging to national 
minorities - e.g. equality regardless of 
ethnicity, the right to preserve one’s national 
identity, and the right to use one’s native 
language
128
 - their practical application is 
undermined by the region’s autocracy, and 
issues such as corruption in law-
enforcement structures.
129
 As it is in the case 
of Moldova west of the Dniester/Nistru, 
decision-making on issues affecting 
minorities, such as curricula, is mostly 
centralized.
130
 
Regional identity is partially defined 
by Transnistria’s separateness from the rest 
of Moldova, with the Russian language 
occupying a central role in its self-
definition. Indeed, despite Transnistria’s 
recognition of three official languages, the 
Russian language predominates in inter-
ethnic communication,
131
 and in most 
spheres of language use, including 
government, higher education and the 
media. Even with the de facto privileged 
status of Russian, the Transnistrian 
authorities pursue a policy balancing the 
three main ethnic groups. Thus, for example, 
approximately a third of primary schools in 
Transnistria employ Ukrainian as language 
of instruction; some broadcasts and one 
newspaper are in Ukrainian, and broadcasts 
emanating from Ukraine itself are also 
available.
132
 However, the focus on the three 
main ethno-linguistic groups tends to imply 
the marginalization of smaller ethnic groups. 
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This point was clearly articulated by UN 
Senior Expert on Human Rights in 
Transnistria Thomas Hammarberg, when he 
said that: ‘[t]he focus on the balance 
between the three major population groups 
may overshadow the need to protect the 
minorities and their interests’.133 The 
minority groups in question, amounting to 
approximately 10% of the Transnistrian 
population, include Bulgarians, Belarusians, 
Gagauz, Tatars and Roma.
134
 These groups 
are not officially recognized in Transnistria 
as minorities; there are no special 
mechanisms to implement policies related to 
ethnicity, for the representation of ethnic 
and linguistic groups in the de facto 
authorities, or ad hoc advisory bodies.
135
 
Schools operate in one of the three official 
languages, with a second official language 
being learned as a subject,
136
 resulting in no 
guarantees that minority languages will be 
taught.  
Diverging views on the nationalizing 
(and pro-Europe/Romania) state versus the 
multi-national (pro-Russia) state affect 
relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol. 
One of the main areas of contention has 
been the conflicting approaches to the Latin 
alphabet. Transnistrian law prescribes the 
exclusive use of the Cyrillic alphabet for 
Moldovan, although the Latin script is 
permitted in foreign, private schools. 
According to 2012 data, in Transnistria 
4,688 pupils attended schools using the 
Cyrillic script, and 1,244 attended schools 
using the Latin script.
137
 The Latin-script 
schools, which are managed by the Chisinau 
authorities, have, over the years, been 
subjected to various forms of pressure. Of 
eight such schools, two were closed and had 
to transfer outside the Transnistrian-
controlled area. There have been attempts to 
close other schools, as well as disputes on 
premises and intimidation of teachers and 
parents. Negotiations between the two sides, 
mediated by OSCE (and included in the 5+2 
talks), have reduced tensions. In 2014 five 
(out of the six) schools on Transnistrian-
controlled territory were registered as legal 
entities but none were subsequently granted 
accreditation, resulting in their diplomas not 
being recognized in Transnistria.
138
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In the wake of the Crimean crisis, the EU’s 
Association Agreement has been brought 
forward and signed, and a visa-free 
arrangement speedily concluded between the 
EU and Moldova. Russia has attempted to 
contain the EU’s influence on Moldova, and 
a renewed pro-Russia orientation has been 
affirmed in Transnistria. This issue brief has 
argued that an intrinsic duality (a pro-
Russia/Moldovanist versus a pro-
Europe/Romanist position) exacerbates 
divisions within Moldovan society, and with 
it the marginalization of minorities, both 
east and west of the river Dniester/Nistru. 
The EU-Russia divide subsists despite 
attempts inside and outside Moldova to 
mitigate tensions, with the use of 
conciliatory language of mutual 
interdependence between the parties 
involved. The influence from each external 
actor clashes against countervailing forces 
from the other side. These basic divisions 
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reverberate throughout Moldovan society, 
creating or deepening multiple fractures.  
The concerns of non-Russian 
minorities in Moldovan-controlled territory 
can easily be overlooked through a sustained 
focus on the polarization in question. 
Meanwhile, non-Russian minorities west of 
the river face a double challenge: in addition 
to their languages being at the margins of 
the two primary linguistic spheres, they 
generally do not benefit from linguistic 
integration, as they tend to have only limited 
proficiency in the state language. The full 
upgrading of Moldovan/Romanian to de 
facto state language is still to be fully 
attained, thus the state language remains 
unequipped to act as a unifying factor for 
Moldova’s ethno-linguistic groups. Yet 
efforts to promote the state language run the 
risk of minority languages becoming 
increasingly sidelined, exacerbating an 
assimilatory trend vis-à-vis these minorities, 
through their absorption into the Russian 
linguistic and cultural sphere. Moldova faces 
a formidable challenge in the attempt to 
upgrade the state language while 
simultaneously supporting linguistic 
diversity; it needs to strike a delicate balance 
between these two objectives. 
Other factors contributing to the 
marginalization of non-Russian minorities 
include: the difficulty in reducing the 
extremely high levels of isolation of Roma; 
a general opacity of legal provisions and 
policies on minority rights (despite some 
improvement towards legal clarity with the 
recent adoption of anti-discrimination 
legislation); restricted opportunities for 
participation and empowerment of 
minorities; centralization, and limited 
devolution of powers at both the regional or 
local levels. In parallel to this, the 
politicization of language issues, as well as 
the disempowerment and exclusion of 
minorities, contribute to the fragility of the 
political system. Monitoring under the 
FCNM has highlighted most such concerns; 
these issues are likely to continue to 
reproduce themselves in both Council of 
Europe and EU monitoring, and in a 
possible future application of the 
Copenhagen Criteria in Moldova. In the case 
of Transnistria, minorities (outside the three 
main groups) are marginalized inasmuch as 
the breakaway region offers no mechanisms 
to devise or implement minority policies, 
while general human rights legislation is 
undermined by the autocratic nature of the 
regime.   
Moldova has been affected by high 
levels of political instability between 2009 
and 2013; the situation appears to have 
stabilized, as Chisinau looks towards greater 
EU integration and parliamentary elections 
in November 2014. IGOs’ policies on 
Moldova should be designed taking into 
account multiple rifts within Moldovan 
society, and the specific circumstances 
aggravating the marginalization of minority 
groups (Roma in particular – but not only). 
Primary objectives for the Moldovan 
authorities include: minimizing the impact 
of the East-West polarization on minorities 
and their levels of marginalization; 
increasing clarity of minority-related 
legislation and facilitating its 
implementation; enhancing the effectiveness 
of systems for the protection and 
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empowerment of minorities, as well as 
creating further channels for the use and 
promotion of minority languages. Means to 
these ends include decentralization, and the 
development of multilingual schools.  
In Transnistria, systems should be 
established to involve minorities in decision-
making processes. The EU could further the 
integration of Transnistria – by encouraging 
trade links and supporting confidence-
building between Chisinau and Tiraspol.
139
 
However, true cohesiveness will remain out 
of reach as long as mutually exclusive 
ideological underpinnings characterize the 
relations between the two sides (first of all - 
a nationalizing state versus a multi-ethnic 
state). In Moldova there is a strong argument 
for the provision of greater opportunities for 
ethno-linguistic choices at the micro-level 
(that of the individual, communities and 
local authorities), which do not clash with 
the inflexibility of state-driven (or party-
driven) agendas. 
  
 ECMI- Issue Brief # 33 
 
 
20 | P a g e  
 
Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 Popescu, N. & Litra, L. (2012) ‘Transnistria: A Bottom-Up Solution’. ECFR Policy Brief. At:  
<http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR63_TRANSNISTRIA_BRIEF_AW.pdf>. 
2
 European Commission (EC), ‘European Commission’s Support to the Republic of Moldova’, Memo, 15 May 
2014. At: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-355_en.htm>. The EU-Moldova Association Agreement 
is available at:  <http://eeas.europa.eu/moldova/assoagreement/assoagreement-2013_en.htm>. 
3
 Article 3 states that the aims of political dialogue between the EU and Moldova include the strengthening of 
‘respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the rights of persons belonging […]’ (paragraph e); Article 32 provides that EU-Moldova cooperation may 
encompass areas including ‘fostering more inclusive labour markets and social safety systems that integrate 
disadvantaged people, including people with disabilities and people from minority groups’ (paragraph d). On the 
impact of the Eastern Partnership on minorities, see ‘Ferrari, H. Partnership for all? Measuring the Impact of Eastern 
Partnership on Minorities’, Minority Rights Group Europe Policy Paper, June 2014. At: 
<http://www.minorityrights.org/12422/briefing-papers/partnership-for-all-impact-of-eastern-partnership-on-
minorities.html>.  
4
 This was, for example, pointed out by Iurie Leanca, Moldova’s prime minister. See Oliver, C. ‘Georgia and 
Moldova Fear Russian Backlash from EU Trade Deals’, Financial Times, 22 May 2014. At: 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/085153ee-e18e-11e3-9999-00144feabdc0.html>. 
5
 Reuters, ‘After Crimea, Moldova too Fears “unwanted” Events on Road to EU’, 30 March 2014. At: 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/30/us-ukraine-crisis-moldova-idUSBREA2T0B820140330>. 
6
 In particular, Russia is the only gas supplier to Moldova. The country is also dependent on financial remittances 
from migrants in both EU and Russia. Russia is one of the main destinations for Moldovan migrants; in 2012 
reportedly 38% of all remittances came from Moldovan migrants in Russia, followed by Ukraine, Italy and 
Romania. Tanas, O. ‘Russia Said to Plan Retaliation If Moldova Bolsters EU Ties’, BloombergBusinessWeek. At: 
<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-05-20/russia-said-to-plan-retaliation-if-moldova-strengthens-eu-ties>. 
7
 The river acts as a natural division between the de facto independent state and Moldova. However, there are some 
exceptions: Transnistria controls Bender, on the right bank (west of the river), while some enclaves located on the 
left bank are controlled by the Moldovan government. 
8
 See Brubaker, R. (1996) ‘Nationalizing States in the Old “New Europe” -- and the New’, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 19, pp.411-437. 
9
 Article 1 of Law No. 3465-XI of 1 September 1989 ‘On the Functioning of the Languages Spoken in the Territory 
of the Republic of Moldova’ (hereinafter the ‘Law on Languages’. The same provision is also in the 1994 
Constitution, at Article 13(1). 
10
 See 2004 Population Census, ‘Demographic, National, Cultural and Language Characteristics’. At: 
<http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=en&idc=263&id=2208>. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a joint initiative of the EU and six eastern European countries (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine - the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy). It aims at deepening bilateral relations between the EU and these countries. 
13
 ‘Speech: Time to Show Stronger, More Resolute and Determined Eastern Partnership’, 25 April 2014. At: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-339_en.htm>. 
14
 ‘Remarks by President Herman Van Rompuy Following the European Council’, Press Release, 20 December 
2013. At:<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140244.pdf>. 
15
 ‘Speech: Time to Show Stronger, More Resolute and Determined Eastern Partnership’, op. cit. note 13. 
16
 In 2014 it included Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
17
 Russia has been Moldova’s biggest market for wine. 
18
 EC, ‘European Commission’s Support to the Republic of Moldova’, Memo, 15 May 2014. At: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-355_en.htm>. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 EC, ‘Commissioner Malmström on Visa-free Travel for the Citizens of the Republic of Moldova’, 27 April 2014. 
At: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-137_en.htm>.  
 ECMI- Issue Brief # 33 
 
 
21 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
21
 EC, ‘European Commission’s Support to the Republic of Moldova’, op cit. note 18. 
22
 Additional funding of €25 million was also granted to improve the country’s Vocational Education and Training 
sector, so as to raise the professional skills of the workforce to fully benefit from DCFTA.Ibid. 
23
 EC, ‘Closer to the EU: Additional Funding for Georgia and Moldova’, Press Release, 6 May 2014. At: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-512_en.htm>. 
24
 Eastern Partnership Index (2012). At: <http://eap-index.eu/>. 
25 EC, ‘Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the Republic of Moldova: Progress in 2013 and 
Recommendations for Action’, SWD(2014) 93, 27 March 2014. 
26
 Law No. 121 of 25 May 2012. 
27
 It states that: ‘This law provides the necessary framework for the application of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 
29 June 2000 on the implementation of the principle of equality of persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin 
[…], and Directive 2000/78/ES of 27 November 2000 […]’. 
28
 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), ‘EU Invites Moldova to Sign Association Accord In June’, 13 June 
2014. At: <http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova-eu-association-agreement/25383410.html>. 
29
 Itar-Tass, ‘Moldova’s Association with EU Will Tell on Trade Relations with Russia - Russian Diplomat’, 8 June 
2014. At: <http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/735329>. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Oliver, op. cit. note 4. 
32
 In an interview with the Russian newspaper Kommersant, cited in: Ria Novosti, ‘Russia May Revise Relations 
with Moldova if it Moves Closer to the EU’, 12 May 2014. At: <http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140512/189757404/Russia-
May-Revise-Relations-with-Moldova-if-It-Moves-Closer-to.html>. 
33
 This was noted, for example, by the Moldovan Foreign Minister. RFE/RL, ‘Moldovan Foreign Minister Says 
Ukraine Crisis has led to Reevaluation of CIS’, 19 April 2014. At: <http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova-
interview-gherman/25355432.html>. 
34 Transnistria already declared independence in September 1990, while Moldova was still a Soviet state. Armed 
hostilities broke out in 1992, until, in July of the same year, the two sides agreed to a ceasefire. 
35
 Moldova however recognizes Transnistria’s autonomy, through Law No. 764-XV of 27 December 2001 ‘On the 
Administrative-Territorial Organization of the Republic of Moldova’, and Law No. 173-XVI of 22 July 2005 ‘On 
the Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Settlements on the Left Bank of the Dniester (Transnistria)’. These 
laws are based on Article 110(2) of the Moldovan Constitution, which states that :‘[p]laces on the left bank of the 
Dniester river may be assigned special forms and conditions of autonomy according to the special statutory 
provisions adopted by organic law.’ 
36
 Already in its First Report to the Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), the Moldovan authorities declared that they could not implement the 
FCNM in Transnistria. ‘First Report submitted by the Republic of Moldova pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 1 of 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’, ACFC/SR(2000)002, 29 June 2000, at 33. In 
the case of the European Convention on Human Rights, a declaration contained in Moldova’s 1997 instrument of 
ratification states that the Moldovan authorities cannot guarantee the implementation of the treaty in Transnistria 
until the resolution of the conflict.  
37
 Russia’s de facto control of Transnistria has been acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights: in 
judgements on Transnistria it has ruled that responsibility for human rights violations in the breakaway region lie 
with Russia (primarily) and Moldova. Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Application No. 48787/99, 8 July 2004, and 
Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Applications Nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, 19 October 2012. 
38
 The 5+2 comprise Moldova and Transnistria, as well as Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediators, and the EU 
and the United States as observers. The parties hold regular talks towards a settlement of the conflict and more 
generally on socio-economic, humanitarian and security issues. 
39
 Popescu & Litra, op .cit. note 1. 
40
 RFE/RL, ‘Moldova’s Breakaway Transdniester Urges Moscow to Recognize Independence’, 16 April 2014. 
41
 Euronews, ‘Transnistrian Leader Shevchuk Says He Wants a “Civilised Divorce” with Moldova’, 7 June 2014. 
At: <http://www.euronews.com/2014/06/07/interview-transnistran-president-shevchuk-says-he-wants-a-civilised-
divorce-/>. 
42
 Ibid.  
 ECMI- Issue Brief # 33 
 
 
22 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
43
 Ria Novosti, op. cit. note 32. 
44
 Ursu, V, and Coalson, R, ‘Amid Russia-Ukraine Crisis, Moldova’s Fault Lines Quaver’, RFE/RL, 20 March 2014. 
At: <http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova-russia-ukraine-worries/25304033.html>. The fact that Transnistria was 
under blockade was denied by Chisinau and Kyiv. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 The Moldovan government claimed that it received 2,000 application requests a month for biometric passports 
that allow Moldovans to travel to Schengen countries. RFE/RL, ‘Moldova Woos Transdniester with Visa-free 
Travel to Europe’, 5 June 2014. At: <http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova-woos-transdniester-eu-visa-
free/25411296.html>. Some Transnistrians also have Ukrainian passports. 
47
 Oliver, op. cit. note 4. 
48
 Ciscel, M.H. (2008) ‘Uneasy Compromise: Language and Education in Moldova’. In: A. Pavlenko (ed.) 
Multilingualism in Post-Soviet Countries. Bristol: Multilingual Matters, pp.99-121, at 105.  
49
 March, L. (2007) ‘From Moldovanism to Europeanization? Moldova’s Communists and Nation Building’, 
Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 35(4), pp.601-626, at 601-603. Johansson adds that 
‘[f]or the Moldovanist, Romania is regarded as the country that once annexed Moldova and is hence considered an 
enemy. For the Romanist, Romania is a bridge westwards.’ Johansson, A. (2011) Dissenting Democrats: Nation and 
Democracy in the Republic of Moldova. Stockholm: Stockholm University, at 103. Diverging views on whether 
history should be taught through a Moldovanist or Romanist perspective have also led to political tensions. See 
Ciscel, ibid. 
50
 Roper, S.D. (2005) ‘The Politicization of Education: Identity Formation in Moldova and Transnistria’, Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies, 38, pp.501-5 
51
 Although to attract more votes the party has more recently displayed somehow positive attitudes vis-à-vis 
European integration. 
52
 Protsyk, O. & Osoian, I. (2000) ‘Ethnic or Multi-ethnic Parties? Party Competition and Legislative Recruitment in 
Moldova’, ECMI Working Paper No.47, at 9.  
At:  <http://www.ecmi.de/uploads/tx_lfpubdb/working_paper_47_en.pdf>. 
53
 In a survey conducted by Moldova’s Institute for Public Policy (IPP) in April 2014, respondents were asked what 
they would choose between accession to the EU or the Eurasian Customs Union if a referendum was held on this 
issue. 52% of Moldovans/Romanians stated that they would opt for the EU (and 39% for the Customs Union), while 
only 19% of ethnic Russians would choose the EU (64% the Customs Union), and Ukrainians would 
overwhelmingly choose the Customs Union (78% against 13% for the EU). ‘Others’ would also favour the Customs 
Union (84%, against 5% for the EU). IPP, ‘Barometer of Public Opinion – April 2014’, Final Report, at 59. At: 
<http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&idc=156&id=681>. 
54
 For example, the process towards ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages has 
stalled. Moldova signed the Charter in 2002, but it still had to ratify it in 2014. 
54
 On the Moldovan political environment and its instability, see for example Wilson, A. ‘Filat’s Gamble’. 
openDemocracy, 23 May 2013. At: <http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrew-wilson/filat%E2%80%99s-
gamble>. 
55
 On the Moldovan political environment and its instability, see for example Wilson, A. ‘Filat’s Gamble’. 
openDemocracy, 23 May 2013. At: <http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrew-wilson/filat%E2%80%99s-
gamble>.  
56 Through the 1994 Law on the Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit. Gagauzia’s autonomy is also guaranteed by 
the Constitution. It is the only case of an ethnic group being granted territorial autonomy by law in Eastern Europe 
and the post-Soviet space. Järve, P. (2008) ‘Gagauzia and Moldova: Experiences in Power-sharing’. In: M. Weller 
and B. Metzger (eds.) Settling Self-determination Disputes: Complex Power-sharing in Theory and Practice. 
Leiden: Brill. 
57
 For example, in 2011, several students from the Gagauz minority enrolled in Russian schools failed to pass the 
final Romanian-language test and were not issued diplomas. The regional authorities issued their own diplomas, 
defying the central authorities – an act that was declared illegal by the Ministry of Education. Tensions between 
Chisinau and Comrat were sparked as a result. See Ciurea, C. (2011) ‘Linguistic Policies of Chisinau in Relation to 
UTA Gagauzia’, Policy Brief. Chisinau: Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) ‘Viitorul’. 
58
 The remainder of the population are Bulgarians (5.1%), Ukrainians (3.2%) and 0.9% ‘others’ (2004 census). 
 ECMI- Issue Brief # 33 
 
 
23 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
59
 ACFC (Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities), ‘Third 
Opinion on Moldova’, ACFC/OP/III(2009)003, 11 December 2009, §118-9. 
60 Russia’s offer to import wine from Gagauzia came shortly after the February 2014 referendum (see below). 
Reuters, op. cit. note 5. 
61
 For example, the Centre ‘Pro-Europa’ in Comrat campaigns for greater EU integration, and has accused the 
Gagauz politicians of manipulating public opinion to create anti-EU sentiments.
 Varshalomidze, T.  ‘Moldova: EU 
Integration or Mother Russia?’, Al Jazeera, 19 May 2014. At: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/moldova-eu-integration-mother-russia-
20144296179687342.html>. 
62 Minzarari, D. (2014) ‘The Gagauz Referendum in Moldova: A Russian Political Weapon?’ Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, 11(23). At:  
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41922&tx_ttnews
%5BbackPid%5D=228&cHash=b98af3efb331011f77a67fb9674a635c#.U3tlONzpnGA>. 
63
 Varshalomidze, op. cit. note 61. 
64
 No. 382-XV of 17 July 2001. 
65
 It was ratified by Moldova in 1996. 
66
 There is inconclusive data as to the number of Roma in the country. According to the 2004 census there are 
12,271 Roma in Moldova (0.4% of the population), although estimates have ranged from 15,000 to 20,000. UNDP 
(United Nations Development Program) (2007) ‘Roma in the Republic of Moldova’. Chisinau: UNDP Moldova. At: 
<http://www.undp.md/publications/roma%20_report/Roma%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20Moldova.pdf>; 
CAHROM (Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Roma Issues) (2012) ‘Thematic Report by the Experts of the 
CAHROM Thematic Group on the Role of Central, Local and Regional Authorities in Implementing National Roma 
Inclusion Policy, following the CAHROM thematic visit to Chişinău, Republic of Moldova, 21-23 March 2012’, 
CAHROM (2012)7, 23 May 2012.   
67
 EC, ENP Progress Report, op. cit. note 25, at 3.  
68
 These relate to access to employment, housing, health care, education and access to land. 
69
 UNDP, op. cit. note 66.; ACFC, op. cit. note59, §49-51. The last CERD report also pointed to the ‘continued 
marginalization’ and discrimination of Roma. CERD (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination) 
(2011) ‘Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Seventy-eighth session (14 February–
11 March 2011)/Seventy-ninth session (8 August–2 September 2011)’, Supplement No. 18 (A/66/18), §15. 
70
 According to a UNICEF survey (with data from 2005-2006). UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), 2010. 
‘The Situation of Roma Children in Moldova’. Chisinau: UNICEF, p.23. At: 
<http://www.unicef.org/moldova/2008_001_Eng_Roma_Children.pdf>.   
71
 UNDP, op. cit. note 66. 
72
 For example, Article 5(1) of the Law on Minorities refers to the state’s obligation ‘to contribute to the creation of 
the necessary conditions to preserve,  develop and express the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity’ of 
minorities [emphasis added]. It is unclear, however, what such ‘conditions’ are, and what ‘to contribute’ to their 
creation entails.  
73
 Pivovar, I. (2009) ‘Shadow Report on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities by the Republic of Moldova’. Chisinau: NGO Centre of Interethnic Research of the Republic of 
Moldova, at 3. 
74
 Adopted by Government Decision No. 494 of 8 July 2011. Recommendations on the Action Plan on Roma were 
included in the 2012 ENP Country Progress Report. The EC noted that in 2013 Moldova followed the key 
recommendations from the previous year, and ‘stepped up its implementation of the human rights action plan and 
the action plan in support of the Roma people’. ENP Country Progress Report, op. cit. note 25, at 4. 
75
 See note 26. The law came into force on 1 January 2013. However, in 2014 Moldova had still not ratified Protocol 
No. 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, on the prohibition of discrimination, after signing in 2000.  
76
 Shadow Report (Pivovar), op. cit. note 73, at 2-3. 
77
 ENP Country Progress Report, op. cit. note 25, at 3. 
78
 Ibid., at 2. 
 ECMI- Issue Brief # 33 
 
 
24 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
79
 ACFC, op. cit. note 59, §44; See also CERD, op. cit. note 69, §8-12. Instances of discrimination and harassment 
of minorities have been reported, particularly with regard to Roma and migrant workers from Africa and Asia 
(ACFC, §33; CERD, §10; 13).  
80
 Ciscel, M.H. (2006) ‘A Separate Moldovan Language? The Sociolinguistics of Moldova’s Limba de Stat’, 
Nationalities Papers, 34(5), pp.575-597, at 584; Ciscel, op, cit. note 48, at 380. 
81
 The 1989 Law on Languages (note 9) required civil servants to know both the state language and Russian by 
1994. Many Russian-speakers have failed to learn the state language, referring to various difficulties, including the 
absence of favourable conditions to acquire new language skills (such as inadequate textbooks). Chinn, J. (1994) 
‘The Politics of Language in Moldova’, Demokratizatsiya, 2(2), pp.309-315, at 309. By 2014 there had been only 
limited progress. 
82
 The Constitution states that Moldova ‘recognizes and protects the right to preserve, develop and use the Russian 
language and other languages spoken in the country’ (Art. 13(2)). Other relevant provisions are contained in the Law 
on Minorities (Art. 5(1) and 7). 
83
 The Law (note 9) adds that the combined use of Russian and Moldovan ‘guarantees the realization of […] 
bilingualism’. 
84
 Shadow Report (CReDO), op. cit. note 84, at 9. The Russification of Ukrainians has been particularly acute in 
Transnistria in the cities of Tiraspol, Tighina and Ribnita (CReDO, at 19). Ukrainians live compactly in the North 
and Northeast of the country and several small villages in various regions of Moldova. The Bulgarian minority is 
primarily located around the city of Taraclia. 
85
 Ibid., at 19-20. 
86
 Shadow Report (Pivovar), op. cit., note 73, at 10. 
87
 Ibid. Similar figures are given by the Moldovan government in the ‘Third Report submitted by the Republic of 
Moldova pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities’, ACFC/SR(2000)002, 29 February 2009,  at 28. The figure indicated in the CReDO Shadow Report is 
slightly lower: 5,984 children studying Ukrainian as a subject, and 7,925 children studying Bulgarian. Shadow 
Report (CReDO), op. cit. note 84, at 36. 
88
 ACFC, op. cit. note 59, §138-9. 
89
 Shadow Report (CReDO), op. cit. note 84, at 36. 
90
 ACFC, op. cit. note 59, §140; Shadow Report (CReDO), op. cit. note 84, at 39-40. 
91
 ACFC (ibid.), §143. 
92
 Moldovan Government, op. cit. note 87, at 28-9. 
93
 ACFC, op. cit. note59, §118-9. 
94
 Tetskany, Baltsata, Bratusheny, Markautsy, Gashpar and Maksimovka. 
95
 Shadow Report (CReDO), op. cit. note 84, at 21. 
96
 ACFC, op. cit. note 59, §83. 
97
 Ibid., §112. The various programmes are listed in the report submitted to the ACFC by the Moldovan 
Government, op. cit. note 87, at 26. 
98
 ACFC, op. cit. note 59, §113. 
99
 Ibid., §111; Shadow Report (CReDO), op. cit. note 84, at 43; 46. 
100
 Moldovan Government, op. cit. note 87, at 26. 
101
 Shadow Report (Pivovar), op. cit. note 73, at 7. 
102
 Article 22 of the Law on Minorities. 
103
 I have written on this in relation to Russia. See Prina, F. (2012) ‘Power, Politics and Participation: the Russian 
Federation’s National Minorities and their Participatory Rights’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 30(1), 
pp.66-96, at 81-83. 
104
 ACFC op. cit. note 59, §63; §18. The same has been noted with regard to the Co-ordinating Council of Ethno-
Cultural Organizations, which operates under the umbrella of the Bureau as an advisory body. It brings together the 
leaders of minority organizations (ethno-cultural non-governmental associations). As for the Bureau, the activities of 
the Co-ordinating Council are mostly confined to the cultural sphere.  ACFC, op. cit. note 59, §63; Shadow Report 
(Pivovar), op. cit., note 73, at 11. 
105
 As well as on the basis of language, religion, gender, wealth or social status. Law on Political Parties No. 294-
XVI of 21 December 2007, at Article 3(6). 
 ECMI- Issue Brief # 33 
 
 
25 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
106
 ACFC, op. cit. note 59, §161. There are no special measures in Moldova, for example in the shape of reserved 
seats, to guarantee minority representation. The Moldovan government claimed in 2009 that 40% of the members of 
Parliament  of Moldova belonged to national minorities (Moldovan Government, op. cit. note 87,  at 32), although in 
the Shadow Report (Pivovar) the percentage of 20% is given (Shadow Report (Pivovar), op. cit. note 73, at 11). The 
ACFC also pointed to the very limited representation of Roma, and smaller minorities, both at the central or local 
level (ACFC, op. cit. note 59, §163). See also CERD, op. cit. note 69, §16. 
107 See also Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law) (2007) ‘Opinion 
No.431/2007: Comments on the Draft Law on Political Parties of the Republic of Moldova’, prepared by Hans-
Heinrich Vogel, endorsed by the Venice Commission at its 71st Plenary session of 1-2 June 2007. Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe; and OSCE/ODIHR (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe/Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) (2007) ‘Comments on the Draft Law on Political Parties of the Republic 
of Moldova’.  
108
 ACFC, op. cit. note 59, §97. The ACFC has recommended the removal of this restriction (§99). 
109
 Shadow Report (CReDO), op. cit. note 84, at 43;46 
110
 Ibid., at 7; 15; 47. 
111
 ACFC, op. cit. note 59, §169-170; CERD, op. cit. note 69, §16; and Shadow Report (Pivovar), op. cit. note 73, at 
11. 
112
 Article 24, Law on Minorities. 
113
 Article 27(1)(b) of Law No. 158 of 4 July 2008 ‘On Civil Service and Status of Civil Servants’, and Article 7 of 
the Law on Languages. 
114
 EC, ‘Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Republic of Moldova: Progress in 2012 and 
Recommendations for Action’, SWD(2013) 80, 20 March 2013, at 5.  
115
 Shadow Report (CReDO), op. cit. note 84, at 48; 50.This is despite the fact that Moldova ratified the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government in 1997. 
116
 Protsyk, O. (2010) ‘Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova: The Real and the Virtual in Post-Soviet State Design’. In: M. 
Weller and K. Nobbs (eds.) Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, pp.231-251. On Gagauzia, see also King, C. (1997) ‘Minorities Policy in the Post-Soviet 
Republics: The Case of Gagauzia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 20(4), pp.738-756; and Thompson, P. (1998) ‘The 
Gagauz in Moldova and their Road to Autonomy’. In: M. Opalski (ed.) Managing Diversity in Plural Society: 
Minorities, Migration and Nation-building in Post-Communist Europe. Ottawa: Forum Eastern Europe, pp.128-147. 
117
 ACFC op. cit., note 59, §33;178. 
118
 Protsyk, op. cit. note 116. 
119
 Ibid. Gagauzia has attempted to challenge the central authorities in the Constitutional Court, to strengthen the 
autonomy of Gagauzia. However, attempts for greater autonomy have generally failed. Ibid. 
120
 Shadow Report (CReDO), op. cit. note 84, at 47. 
121
 These results are based on research on six villages. Shadow Report (CReDO), op. cit. note 109, at 41. 
122
 Ibid., at 47-8. 
123
 Ibid., at 41-43; 44-46. 
124
 Cited in OSCE/HCNM (2012) ‘The Moldovan-Administered Latin-Script Schools in Transdniestria: 
Background, Current Situation, Analysis and Recommendations’, at 9. At: 
<http://www.osce.org/ru/moldova/99062>. The decision involved: replacing the teaching of ‘History of the 
Romanians’ with ‘History of Moldova and the USSR’, and the teaching of Moldovan using the Cyrillic alphabet. 
125
 Article 12 of the 1995 Transnistrian Constitution.  
126 The census was carried out by the Transnistrian de facto government. ‘Naselenie Pridnestrov’ya po perepisi 2004 
goda’ [The Transnistria Population according to the 2004 Census]. Demoskop-Weekly. No. 213-214, September 
2005. At: <http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2005/0213/panorm01.php#2>.  
127
 Article 6 of the Language Act of Transnistria states that ‘the written form of the Moldovan language in all cases 
is the original Cyrillic alphabet’. In addition, Article 200(3) of the 2002 Transnistrian Code of Administrative 
Offences provides that the use of the Latin alphabet for the Moldovan language is punishable with a fine of up to 50 
minimum wages. 
128
 Transnistrian Constitution. Provisions on equality are also found in the 2002 Criminal Code (Art. 133). 
 ECMI- Issue Brief # 33 
 
 
26 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
129 Hammarberg, T. (2013) ‘Report on Human Rights in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova’, 
United Nations, 14 February 2013, at 10. At: 
<http://www.un.md/key_doc_pub/Senior_Expert_Hammarberg_Report_TN_Human_Rights.pdf> 
130
 Ibid., at 37. 
131 Ibid., at 35; Pavlenko, A. (2008) Russian in Post-Soviet Countries. Russian Linguistics 32, pp.59-80, at 62.   
132 Hammarberg, op. cit. note 129, at 35.  
133
 Ibid., at 36. 
134
 According to the 2004 Transnistrian census (note 126), the overall population of Transnistria amounted to 
555,347. Estimates suggest that there are 5,500-6,000 Roma in Transnistria, although the 2004 census recorded only 
507 persons. The reason might be linked to fear of discrimination, which might have led persons of Roma origins 
not to self-identify as such. Hammarberg, op. cit. note 129, at.36.   
135
 Hammarberg advised that a commission comprising members of minorities be established, so as to give them an 
effective channel to key decision-makers. Ibid., at.36. 
136
 Ibid., at 37. 
137
 Ibid. 
138
 Ibid.; OSCE/HCNM, op. cit. note 124, at 18. In the judgement Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia (see 
note 37) the European Court of Human Rights held that this situation amounted to a violation of the right to 
education protected at Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR. 
139
 On this, see also Popescu & Litra, op .cit. note 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ECMI- Issue Brief # 33 
 
 
27 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
 
Federica Prina 
Editor of the Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (JEMIE)/Consultant at the 
ECMI 
 
Contact: prina@ecmi.de  
 
 
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION SEE 
 
EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (ECMI)  
Schiffbruecke 12 (Kompagnietor) D-24939 Flensburg  
 +49-(0)461-14 14 9-0 *  fax +49-(0)461-14 14 9-19  
*  E-Mail: info@ecmi.de    
* Internet: www.ecmi.de 
 
 
